"Will the real oligarchs please stand up," by
Nicholas Strakon, part two.
www.thornwalker.com/ditch/indispensable_02.htm
Reprint
rights
Our Walter Karp table
of contents
TOC for Strakon's article
One-party America
Everyone knows about the one-party South of yore but it was a regional fluke, an exception to the general rule of glorious American democracy. And, well, yes, there were those big-city machines in the North but those were flukes, too. And, all right, there used to be a lot of Republican one-party states in New England, the Midwest, and West still more flukes. It took Karp to notice that, decade after decade, there were an awful lot of flukes swimming in the American political waters, and damned few other fish. Writing in the early 1970s, he pointed out:
In more than two-thirds of the states of the Union, one party or the other has been predominant for thirty, fifty or even a hundred years. Measured by control of the state assembly ... most states can be described as permanently Democratic or permanently Republican. In those states the second party is a more or less chronic legislative minority; on the occasions when it does gain a majority, it usually loses it in the following election like water seeking its own level. (p. 9)
Many states, he writes, featured a "geographical division
... into more or less distinctive party satrapies." (p. 11)
In New York, Democrat strength traditionally was
confined to New York City; in Indiana, to the southern
section and a few cities. In Missouri, Republican strength
was restricted to the western part of the state; in
Oklahoma, to the panhandle and north-central section.
And so on.
In accounting for that, Karp fires a withering barrage of
facts and analysis at the usual explanations, which advert
to sociological factors, local traditions, or the "natural
affinity" of voters for one party or the other. He also
dynamites into dust "the axiom that political parties have
but one principle of action: to win election victories at all
costs." (p. 9) The principle actually shared by those who
control the party organization, he demonstrates, is
maintaining that control.
This is not just ordinary careerism, for vast boodle is at
stake: party regulars must see to it that "special
privileges are not stripped away from special interests
that have been paying the organization heavily for
protecting those privileges." (p. 22) To maintain control,
the party regulars will dump elections as necessary,
deliberately carve states into those "party satrapies," and accept
permanent minority status in whole states or even whole
regions. Here is a nice illustration of the prevailing
philosophy:
Knowing which side their bread is buttered on, the
regulars of one party systematically cooperate with the
regulars of the other party their "indispensable
enemies" to foil the rising of mavericks in
either party. Thus, for instance, "It is the common
practice in many state legislatures for the minority
party to throw its votes for Speaker of the House and
other key posts to the regulars' candidate whenever the
majority party's insurgents have a strong candidate of
their own." (p. 44) And when a third party arises that
might pose a genuine threat to the duopoly parties, they
routinely unite against it. In many states, the duopoly
parties have unashamedly written their collusion right
into the statute books in the form of draconian
ballot-access laws.
In proving his point, Karp spreads out a royal feast for
connoisseurs of outrageous political stories. Typically
delicious is his account of how the bosses of the Virginia
GOP always came to the aid of Robert Byrd's Democrat
machine whenever it was threatened, mobilizing the
Republican rank and file to vote for Byrd candidates
against insurgents in the Democrat primary and
deliberately nominating weak GOP candidates for the
general election. In 1964, a "Byrd machine candidate for
Congress won very narrowly over a Republican. Two
years later political observers the 'authoritative'
Congressional Quarterly among them predicted a
hotly contested fight for the seat. Instead the
Republicans put up nobody." (p. 45) Mr. Nobody runs
again! ***
Winning elections can be calamitous. On that subject,
Karp's treatment of the 1937 court-packing fight may
impress conscientious haters of Franklin Roosevelt as the
author's most breathtaking tour de force. [2]
Simply put, the Democracy won too big in 1934 and
1936: "Far from being an opportunity, the landslide
Democratic majorities ... were a stark danger to the
Roosevelt Administration. Lopsided majorities always
are, because they weaken the ability of the party
oligarchs to control legislation." (p. 127) Libertarians
who understand that Wall Street-aristocrat Roosevelt's
mission was to save and extend American state
capitalism will see the problem immediately. As a result
of the 1934 and 1936 landslides, all manner of Democrat
mavericks and radicals had poured into Congress. The
party oligarchs had to get rid of as many of those wild
men as possible.
Karp's chronicle of the "charade of 'blunders'" that
followed is high entertainment indeed. Roosevelt,
"blundering" brilliantly in the struggle to pack the
Supreme Court, "tie[d] up and virtually kill[ed] the first
session of an unruly, reform-minded Congress";
"prove[d] that Congress could defy him," which set up a
ready excuse for the failure of future reform; and "tie[d]
an albatross around the necks" of the Democrat
reformers from normally Republican districts who had
bought his reformist rhetoric and loyally stood by him.
(pp. 137-38)
In 1938, the Republicans gained 75 House seats, and the
Democrat wild men were slaughtered.
To the
next part: "Plague of
locuses."
Posted June 8, 2002
Posted in 2002 by WTM
Enterprises.
Notice to visitors who
came
straight to this document from off site: You are deep in
The Last Ditch. You should
check out our home page and table of
contents.
It was a Republican state party boss,
Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania, who early this
century stated with notable candor the basic principle
and purpose of present-day party politics. In the face of
a powerful state and national resurgence of reform and
the sentiments of the majority of the Republican rank and
file, Penrose put up a losing slate of stand-pat party
hacks. When a fellow Republican accused him of ruining
the party, Penrose replied, "Yes, but I'll preside over the
ruins." (pp. 18-19)