References
[Editor’s notes are in blue.]

* The title refers to Nathaniel Branden’s lecture “The Concept of God,” from his lecture series “The Basic Principles of Objectivism.” That lecture is fully transcribed in his book The Vision of Ayn Rand, chapter 4. Partial and perhaps complete audios seem to be available throughout the Internet. See also R.A. Childs, “The Epistemological Basis of Anarchismm,” Note 19.

[01] A. Rand, “The Psycho-Epistemology of Art,” 4/4/15j [April 1965] [References of this form refer to The Objectivist Newsletter, so that volume 4, number 3 would be March 1965. After volume 4, the name of the publication was The Objectivist. The page numbers for the latter are those of the original format, not those in the bound volume.] and RM 16 [The Romantic Manifesto (paperback edition)].
MMOne of the distinguishing characteristics of a work of art (including literature, i.e., fiction), is that it serves no practical, material end, but is an end in itself; it serves no purpose other than contemplation — and the pleasure of that contemplation is so intense, so deeply personal that a man experiences it as a self-sufficient, self-justifying primary and, often, resists or resents any suggestion to analyze it: the suggestion, to him, has the quality of an attack on his identity, in his deepest, essential self. s

A. Rand, “Art and Moral Treason,” 4/3/13h-i [March 1965] and RM 148–49.
MMHis rationality is turned against him by means of a similar dichotomy: reason versus emotion. His Romantic sense of life is only a sense, an incoherent emotion which he can neither communicate nor explain nor defend. It is an intense, yet fragile emotion, painfully vulnerable to any sarcastic allegation, since he is unable to identify its real meaning.
MMIt is easy to convince a child, and particularly an adolescent, that his desire to emulate Buck Rogers is ridiculous: he knows that it isn’t exactly Buck Rogers he has in mind and yet, simultaneously, it is — he feels caught in an inner contradiction — and this confirms his desolately embarrassing feeling that he is being ridiculous.

A. Rand. FNI 58 [For the New Intellectual; James is citing the hardback. The paperback page number is 55.]
MMNor does one need a full system of philosophical epistemology in order to distinguish one’s own considered judgement from one’s feelings, wishes, hopes, or fears.

[02] In the analysis that follows, I am indebted to C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (Macmillan Paperback, 1960), pp. 121–34; The World’s Last Night and Other Essays (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1960), pp. 13–30; and English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama (Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 32–37, 187–91 et passim.

[03] N. Branden, “‘The Stolen Concept,’” 2/1/2j-aa [January 1963].
MMTo declare that that the axioms of logic are “arbitrary” is to ignore the context which gives rise to such a concept as the “arbitrary.” An arbitrary idea is one accepted by chance, caprice, or whim; it stands in contradistinction to an idea accepted for logical reasons, from which it is intended to be distinguished. The existence of such a concept as an “arbitrary” idea is made possible only by the existence of logically necessary ideas: the former is not a primary; it is genetically dependent on the latter. To maintain that logic is “arbitrary” is to divest the concept of meaning.

N. Branden, “‘The Stolen Concept’” 2/1/4h [January 1963].
MMOne of the most grotesque instance of the stolen concept fallacy may be observed in the prevalent claim — made by neo-mystics and old-fashioned mystics alike — that the acceptance of reason rests ultimately on “an act of faith.”
MMReason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by the senses. Faith is the acceptance of ideas or allegations without sensory evidence or rational demonstration. “Faith in reason” is a contradiction in terms. “Faith” is a concept that possesses meaning only in contradistinction to reason. The concept “faith” cannot antecede reason, it cannot provide grounds for the acceptance of reason — it is the revolt against reason.

R. [Robert] Efron, “Biology Without Consciousness — and Its Consequences,” 7/5/13d. [May 1968; reprinted from Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, vol. II, no. 1, Autumn 1967.]
MMIndeed, it is the philosopher who is in large part responsible for this smashup in biology. He has consistently advocated the use of invidious epistemological remedies for philosophical and scientific problems....
MMHe has often maintained that all human knowledge starts with an act of faith.

[04] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part 1, Question 79, Article 8.

[05] Samuel Johnson, Dictionary (London 1755).

[06] AS [Atlas Shrugged] 942uu-vv [hardback] (1016bb-cc [paperback]).
MMReason is the faculty that perceives, identifies, and integrates the material provided by [man’s] senses.

[07] Blaise Pascal, Pensées, Chevalier fragment 477, p. 164, trans. J.M. Cohen (Penguin, 1961).

[08] Ibid., fragment 479, pp. 164–65.