| References
[01] This recognition is common to most schools of realism. See, for example, Edwin B. Holt, et al., The New Realism (New York, Macmillan, 1912), pp. 66–67.
[02] See R.W. Sellars: “The epistemological task is not the replacement of natural realism but its development,” in The Philosophy of Physical Realism (New York, Macmillan, 1932), p. v.
[03] See R.B. Perry, “A Realistic Theory of Independence,” in The New Realism, op. cit.
[04] The failure to recognize this distinction, however, is not uncommon among philosophers today. See, for example, Robert S. Hartman, “The Epistemology of the A Priori,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, VIII, No. 4 (June 1948), 732.
[05] This criticism does not hold, of course, when the idea is thought of as a formal, rather than as an instrumental, sign, for the nature of a formal sign is precisely identical with its
signatum.
[06] De Anima, 431b, 20–21.
[07] See W.P. Montague’s article in Philosophy, XII (1937), 143; also Durant Drake et al., Essays in Critical Realism (London, Macmillan, 1920), p. vii.
[08] R.M. Eaton, “What Is the Problem of Knowledge?,” The Journal of Philosophy, XX, (1923), 178, 180.
[09] See John Wild, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” in The Return to Reason: Essays in Realistic Philosophy (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 36 ff.
[10] See Joseph Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae (Friburgi Brisgoviae, Hader, 1909–12), I, 91–93; II, 306–7; also Harmon Chapman, “Realism and Phenomenology,” in The Return to Reason, op. cit., pp. 22 ff.
[11] See R.B. Perry, General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest (Cambridge, Mass.. Harvard University Press, 1950), Chap. 12, passim.
[12] See Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies (New York, Longmans, Green, 1929), p. 307: “Modern realism [namely, neorealism] is closer to the monistic realism of ‘ideas’ suggested by Hume....”
[13] De Anima, 432b, 29–30.
[14] Durant Drake’s article in Journal of Philosophy, XXVIII (1931), 239.
[15] Ibid., p. 240.
[16] There is, of course, the further possibility, noted earlier, of denying existence as anything distinct from essence, so that there is no existence to be either identical or diverse. This is the position, usually implicit and often explicit, of American neurealism. Sec especially The New Realism, op. cit., p. 368.
[17] It is possible that the cognitive relation may be better described as a so-called “transcendental” relation rather than as an ordinary “predicamental” relation. If this is done, the foundation of the relation and the relation proper will be regarded as merged into one element of the relational structure: the foundational act of knowing which is the cognitive species together with its reference to the terminus — the object. But the choice between these two interpretations will not make any essential difference to the present analysis.
[18] In this sentence the expression “what is before my mind” is used to denote the presumptively independent object and the expression “my car.” the factually independent object, according to the terminology employed earlier. Whether or not these two actually coincide must be postponed, as mentioned earlier, until the question of truth is considered.
[19] For a more detailed account of sensory and rational cognition, see John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Phllosophy (New York, Harper, 1948), Chaps. 18 and 19.
[21] For a treatment of the third rational operation of reasoning or demonstrating, which we shall not here consider, see “For a Realistic Logic,” by Henry Veatch [in The Return to Reason, pp. 192 ff.]
[22] The Ways of Things (New York, Prentice Hall, 1940), p. 270.
[23] See Plato, Theaetetus, 187A ff.
[24] This last alternative seems to be the view held by Professors C.I. Lewis and H.M. Sheffer. See Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Ill., Open Court, 1946), pp. 48–49.
[25] Again. this relation may be interpreted as transcendental rather than as predicamental without affecting the present analysis. (See Note 17.)
[26] It should be noted, however, that the idealist view that all relations are “internal” tends, in effect. to destroy the distinction between substance and attribute. For a treatment of this distinction, see Manley H. Thompson, Jr., “On the
Distinction between Thing and Property,” in The Return to Reason, op. cit. pp. 125 ff. 
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