For a Realistic Logic
Henry Veatch, Indiana University
(Originally published in The Return to Reason: Essays in Realistic Philosophy,
John Wild, ed. [Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1953].)
References

[01] Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman K. Smith (London, Macmillan, 1929), Preface to 2nd ed., B viii.

[02] Ibid.

[03] We do not mean to imply that this interpretation of Aristotelian logic is necessarily the correct one; all we mean is that it is the current and common one. Indeed, for the last three centuries or so, the term “Aristotelian logic” has tended to signify a purely formal logic, these “forms” being considered quite apart from any intentional function which they might happen to have. Rather than attempt to revise this conception of Aristotelian logic or to consider whether it is just either to Aristotle or to the Aristotelian tradition, we propose simply to accept it at its face value. For whether genuinely Aristotelian or not, such a logic, we think, is quite ill-adapted to the purposes of a genuinely realistic philosophy.

[04] It is well known that mathematical logicians do not consider that the new logic is in any way contradictory to Aristotelian logic. Quite the contrary. it is merely more extensive and comprehensive, with the result that the older logic can be simply taken up into and absorbed by, the new. Again (see the preceding note), we do not in this paper wish to challenge this view of the relation between mathematical logic and so-called Aristotelian logic. On the contrary, as the latter has generally come to be conceived and understood, the mathematical logician is quite correct in supposing that Aristotelian formal logic represents but an insignificant part of mathematical logic. Our point is rather that a realistic logic must differ radically from both mathematical logic and Aristotelian logic as so understood.

[05] On this notion of intentionality, see the relevant section of Francis Parker’s essay [“Realistic Epistemology” in The Return to Reason (hereafter “in Wild”), pp. 158 ff.]; also the essay by Harmon Chapman, “Realism and Phenomenology,” in The Return to Reason, John Wild, ed. (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1953), pp. 22 ff.

[06] Again, see Parker’s essay [in Wild, pp. 168 ff.].

[07] In this brief essay, we are considering only deductive argument, not induction.

[08] See above [in Wild, p. 178].

[09] Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1922), p. 39.

[10] This word has often been taken in a Pickwickian sense in the context of modern logic.

[11] The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (lectures delivered in 1918 and published in the Monist, 1918–19; republished by the Department of Philosophy, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, no date), p. 12. See also Russell’s comments on Wittgenstein in his Introduction to the Tractatus, op. cit., especially pp. 8–11.

[12] Otherwise, there would be no point in insisting on the likeness of the symbol to the thing symbolized. That is to say, on this view it is only through recognizing the likeness that one comes to recognize that which it is like. Hence one must first come to know the symbol, and only then does one come to know what is symbolized, on the ground that the former is like or similar to the latter.

[13] On the difficulties of a correspondence theory see Parker’s essay, [in Wild, pp. 156 ff.].

[14] To use more technical language, one might say that white instrumental (in this case. iconic) signs are entirely proper, one cannot expect them to displace or substitute for so-called formal signs. See John Wild’s article, “An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Signs,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, VIII, (Dec. 1947), 217 ff.

[15] See Professor Lewis’s use of this adjective in Mind and the World-Order. (New York, Scribner 1929), p. 27.

[16] This diffidence proceeds from many sources. In the first place, there are various current senses of “identity” with which identity in our sense must not be confused, but almost inevitably will be confused. For instance, the idealistic logicians speak of identity, apparently thinking of it as connected with the Absolute which absorbs all differences within itself. Also, the mathematical logicians speak of identity after the analogy of equality, as if there could be a relation of identity between individuals or classes of individuals. But clearly, the intentional identity of which we are speaking is of neither of these two types.
MMBut in the second place, even within the context of realism it would seem necessary to distinguish between the purely logical relation of identity, with which we are here concerned, and that real relation of cognitive identity which is basic to any realistic epistemology (see Parker’s essay, especially pp. 163 ff. [in Wild]). The latter is a real relation, the former only a relation of reason. Also, the latter is the end, the former only the means to the end. For instance, the logical relation of identity between subject and predicate is a means or instrument of the real relation of cognitive identity between knower and known.

[17] Incidentally, it might be remarked that both nominalism and extreme realism seem to overlook the relational character of universals. The former sticks simply to the individuals and refuses to recognize that intellectually it is impossible to abstract their essence from them and so relate it back to them. On the other hand, extreme realism fixes upon the abstracted essence but forgets that, as thus abstract, the essence or “what” is wholly and completely in relation to the individuals from which it has been abstracted.

[18] As thus described, the relation of predicate to subject in a proposition would seem to be no different from the relation of abstracted essence to individuals in a concept. Nor is it to be denied that a concept, by the very fact that it is abstract and universal, is necessarily predicable of the individuals to which it is related by a relation of identity. Still, the concept as such as predicable and identifiable, not actually predicated and identified.

[19] See below [in Wild, pp. 190–92].

[20] It should be apparent that this notion of a syllogism as being an instrument for the intention of causes presupposes the realistic view of causal transaction (see John Wild, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” in The Return to Reason, op. cit., pp. 36 ff.); see also his “A Realistic Defense of Causal Efficacy,” Review of Metaphvsics, II, No. 8 (June 1949), 1–14, in contrast to a Humean view of a cause as an atomic event prior in time to its effect.

[21] The distinction between “thing” and “property” here may be taken to be synonymous with the distinction between substance and accidents. See the essay by Manley H. Hopkins, Jr., [in Wild], pp. 125 ff.

[22] In other words, there is no reason why a concept of a relation or relational complex could not be represented more or less iconically through the symbolic device of the propositional function. The point would be that the relation of the concept to what it was a concept of would be a relation of identity, for all that.

[23] Here we are using “thing” not in the narrower sense of substance (see above Note 21) but rather in the broadest sense possible, as synonymous with being itself.

[24] Nouveaux essais sur l’entendent humain (Paris, Flammarion, n. d.), Liv. IV, Chap. 17, §4, p. 248.

[25] Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences (2nd rev. ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 121 ff.

[26] This is the way Tarski chooses to symbolize that general relational property exemplified in the relation of equality: Things equal to the same are equal to each other.

[27] This would actually seem to be Einstein’s view. See the article by Professor A. Ushenko in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (“The Library of Living Philosophers,” VIII [New York, Tudor, 1949]), p. 636.

[28] On these, see again John Wild, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” op. cit., pp. 38 ff.
 
 

Thornwalker main pageNNNNRecoveries contents

Realistic Epistemology NNNNReturning to Reason

E-mail Thornwalker at neff@thornwalker.com.

Copyright © 2001–2016 Ronald N. Neff, d/b/a Thornwalker.com

Thornwalker.com is hosted by pair Networks.