I promised at the beginning of this paper [“Objectivism and Theism”] that, after presenting the positive case for theism on Objectivist grounds, I would examine Dr. [Nathaniel] Branden’s arguments and state where, in my judgement, he goes astray. To this task I now turn.

Omnipotence and Contradiction

Dr. Branden says that if God is omnipotent, then contradictions must be possible. He asks whether I believe that God can tie a knot that he cannot untie, and when I say, “No, I do not, ” he will presumably reply, “Aha! then you admit that there is something that God cannot do. Therefore he is not omnipotent.”

I suggest that Dr. Branden is guilty of the Fallacy of the Stockbroker’s Address. Suppose that it turns out not to be true that Jones knows his stockbroker’s address. This might seem to indicate a gap in Jones’s knowledge, but in fact it does not. Jones does not have a stockbroker, and so there is no address to be known. If someone says, “There is at least one thing that Jones does not know, namely, his stockbroker’s address,” we may reply that the phrase “his stockbroker’s address” does not refer to anything, and so nothing has been indicated thereby that Jones does not know.

If it is false that Jones knows his stockbroker’s address, and if there is such a thing (such a piece of knowledge) as Jones’s stockbroker’s address, then it follows that Jones is ignorant of his stockbroker’s address, that there is a gap in his knowledge. And similarly, if it is false that God can do X, and if the phrase “doing X” refers to something, if we can logically [01] explain what it would mean to do X, then it follows that God cannot do X and there is a gap in his power. But when X is a contradiction, no such conclusion follows. [02]

Before asking whether there are restrictions on God’s power, we must distinguish restrictions. Suppose that Jones is in a locked room. He cannot go to any place outside the room. Clearly he is restricted in his movements. Now suppose that he is released. He is free to go anywhere. But someone objects: “Anywhere? Is he free to travel to a spot ninety-one degrees north of the Equator? Is he free to visit Strelsau, the capital of Ruritania? If not, then his movements are still restricted. There are some places he is not free to go.” To this reply: “Not so. Ruritania is a fictional country, [03] and there is no spot ninety-one degrees north of the Equator. If there are places he cannot go, you have not named them, for Ruritania is not the name, and 91N is not the latitude, of a real place.”

If someone asks, “Can God make a square circle?” we reply, “God can make any shape whatever, but ‘square circle’ is not the name of a shape.”

If someone asks, “Can God make a stone so heavy that he cannot lift it?” we reply as follows: Given any finite number, God can make a stone weighing more than that number of pounds. For any man, there is a maximum weight that he can lift, and God can make a stone weighing more than that weight. But there is no maximum weight that God can lift, and so to ask, “Can God make a stone heavier than the maximum weight God can lift?” is not to specify a weight at all. It is as if one had asked, “Can God make a stone that is heavier than the number seven is prime?” It simply makes no sense. And Dr. Branden must ask the theist a meaningful question if he expects an answer.

Suppose that two schoolboys, Bill and Bob, are reviewing state capitals, and that Bill cannot stump Bob, i.e., Bill cannot name a state that Bob cannot name the capital of. If Bob can name the capitals of all the states, then Bill’s inability to stump him is in no way to Bill’s discredit, and it would be quite wrong to suppose that if only Bill were cleverer, he could come up with the name of a state whose capital Bob does not know. If there is no such state, then expecting Bill to think of it is to reveal a flaw, not in Bill, but in the reasoning of the expecter.

The same holds true if Bill is trying to tie a knot that Bob cannot untie, or make a weight so heavy that Bob cannot lift it, or a mountain so high that Bob cannot climb it. If Bob can untie any knot whatever (or climb any mountain, or lift any weight whatever), then no limit on Bill’s power or ingenuity is indicated by his not being able to tie a knot that will stump Bob. Such a knot does not exist, either in reality or in the consistent imagination, and therefore it is not a “something that Bill cannot do,” or indeed a something at all. And just as Bill’s “inability” to stump Bob in an area where nothing at all will stump him is not a genuine inability on Bill’s part, so neither is God’s “inability” to stump himself.

If John the Keensighted cannot see leprechauns because there are none, we must not suppose that this is a flaw in his vision, that if only he were a little more keensighted he could see them. Inability to see an object does not imply a visual defect when the object does not exist. On the contrary, if leprechauns do not exist then it is those who can “see” them, and those who regard not seeing them as a defect, who are in need of assistance. And the same assistance is appropriate to those who regard not being able to make square circles as a defect in the power of an agent. Inability to perform a task when the task is not specified does not imply a lack or defect of power or ability. And a task that has not been non-contradictorily specified has not been specified at all.

Quentin Daniels, newly arrived at Galt’s Gulch, cries out joyously:

“There’s no limit to what’s possible here!” [04]

Those who consider that X’s inability to perform contradictions is a restriction or limit on X’s power will presumably take this statement to mean that contradictions are possible in Galt’s Gulch, that the Gulch represents, not the triumph of reason, but the negation of reason. But the rational reader will recognize that, precisely because contradictions do not exist, because to exist means to exist in a non-contradictory fashion, therefore the ability to do all things and the ability to do all non-contradictory things are precisely identical, just as a list of all the bachelors in the room and a list of all the unmarried bachelors in the room are precisely identical.

References
[Editor’s notes are in blue.]

* The title refers to Nathaniel Branden’s lecture “The Concept of God,” from his lecture series “The Basic Principles of Objectivism.” That lecture is fully transcribed in his book The Vision of Ayn Rand: The Basic Principles of Objectivism (Gilbert, Ariz.: Cobden Press, 2009), chapter 4. Partial and perhaps complete audios seem to be available throughout the Internet, especially here. See also R.A. Childs, “The Epistemological Basis of Anarchism,” Note 19.

[01] AS 943j (1016oo).
  Logic in the art of non-contradictory identification.

[02] A related fallacy is the King of France Fallacy. Someone says: “Either the (present) King of France is bald or the King of France is not bald. A or not A. But either one of these statements implies that there is a King of France. Therefore, there must be a King of France, and therefore France is not really a republic.” (For the benefit of nit-pickers and die-hard royalists, I specify that by a King of France I mean not merely a person of royal descent, but someone actually wielding power as head of the French government.)
  If we follow the advice of Bertrand Russell, chapter 16 of Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, we will interpret “The King of France is bald” as

There exists X such that
  (1) X rules France
  (2) for all Y, if Y rules France then Y is identical with X
  (3) X is bald.

There exists X such that
  (1) X rules France
  (2) for all Y, if Y rules France then Y is identical with X
  (3) X is not bald.

[03] Anthony Hope, The Prisoner of Zenda.

[04] AS 665rr (715pp).